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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in International Accounting, Auditing 
and Financial Management at the International Hellenic University.  
The observating role fullfiled by the board of directors is an essential corporate 
governance control mechanism, particularly in countries where external mechanisms 
are less well developed. The composition of the board based on gender can affect 
the quality of this observating role and thus the financial performance of the firm. 
This is part of the ‘‘business case’’ for female participation on boards, though 
arguments may also be framed in terms of ethical considerations.  
While the matter of board gender diversity has captured researchers’ attention in 
recent years, most empirical results are based on U.S. data. This article is trying to 
focus to an increasing number of non- U.S. studies by investigating the link between 
the gender diversity of the board and firm financial performance in UK, which is a 
country that historically has had minimal female participation in the workforce, but 
which has now introduced legislation to improve equality of opportunities. We 
investigate the topic using panel data analysis and find that gender diversity – as 
measured by the percentage of women on the board and according to two more 
indexes– has a positive effect on firm value and that the opposite causal relationship 
is not significant.  
Our study suggests that investors in UK do not penalize firms which increase their 
female board membership and that greater gender diversity can generate economic 
gains. 
Key Words: board of directors, corporate governance, firm value, women, gender 
diversity 
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1. Introduction to the research problem 
1.1 Introduction 
The importance of effective corporate governance became a hot topic after the 
disclosure of the most high-profile accounting scandals and failures such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Arthur Andersen and Lehman Brothers. Despite the actions of some 
countries to enact guidelines or impose compulsory laws in order to increase the 
womens’ presence on the boards of the listed companies, a wide number of 
boardrooms are still consisted of male directors. Owning to this social discriminating 
method, much attention and criticism have been pointed at those companies’ 
boards of directors’ due to the concern that male directors from the past fail to 
exercise the appropriate measures and independence of judgment to board 
decisions (Burke 2003).  
The issues arising about board profiles stalks from the increased belief that diverse 
groups are likely to be more effective since varied opinions may enforce 
conversation, different innovative ideas and quicker decision making (Forbes & 
Milliken 1998). The organizational perspectives mentioned above ultimately 
constitute the basis for organizations that have a better financial performance. While 
some national capital market regulators, such as UK, Germany, and Australia, have 
introduced some recommendations and disclosure requirements, other countries, 
such as Norway, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Italy, have by legislation a 
minimum requirement 40 % of women’s participation in a company’s board of 
directors (Adams and Ferreira 2009; Rose 2007).  
The intention of these regulatory interventions is to eliminate the social and labor 
grievances that women experienced over time and which use to exclude them from 
higher-scale jobs. Despite the indisputable progress that has been made, the female 
representation in boardrooms is still far from the desired levels. For example, in 
Germany it is observed that women own less than 10 % of participation on 
supervisory boards in the 30 largest listed companies (Holst and Schimeta 2011), 
especially in the countries with non-mandatory gender quotas. It is important to 
 
MSc in Internatiοnal Accοunting, Auditing and Financial 
Management 
 
[6]    Bοard Gender Diversity and firm perfοrmance 
mention at this point the benefits of board gender diversity from an economic and 
ethical point of view.  
First, experts believe that diverse work environment keep employees more satisfied 
and encourage a combination of positive attitudes and behaviors which can lead to 
better decision making. It is a general belief that decisions are preferred when they 
are coming from diverse groups of people with diverse backgrounds and 
perspectives. A study from the Kellogg School of Management supports that belief 
by stating that groups of people of the same gender get worse results than 
heterogeneous groups because the resulting tension or discomfort leads to 
thorouger information processing.  
Moreover, when an organization owns a reputation of being a pleasant workplace 
for diverse groups it automatically has an easier recruitment and selection process 
from today’s diverse hiring pool a fact that can save both money and time. Also, 
some people believe that women directors deal more effectively with risk depending 
on their nature, so the companies which promote women on higher positions can 
only benefit from them. Additionally, women can address in a more effective way 
concerns of customers, employees, shareholders, and the local community in 
general and they also tend to focus on long-term priorities.  
Finally, considering the fact that women directors are likely to be more in tune with 
women’s needs than men are, can help a company or an organization to develop 
successful products and services. Because after all, we should consider that the 
women’s market is key to many industries because they make 41% of purchasing 
decisions. Women-owned businesses have a huge impact on our economy if we 
think that women control trillions of dollars of wealth and influence more than 85% 
of retail decisions. Summarizing, we can state that there is not a miracle worker for 
an organization. But, organizations should at least acknowledge that women can be 
as good and effective as men can. Women should at least be provided with the same 
opportunities as their male counterparts according to board seat participation, 
because it’s the fair thing to do and organizations which refuse to appoint women to 
their boards are stuck in the past and probably are missing out on some 
extraordinary talent. 
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2. Theoretical Background – Women in Governance – Diversity in 
Performance 
There is a long way in literature history that indicates how the governance is 
connected to the gender diversity on the board of directors, focusing on the fact that 
poor governance means lower diversity, (Adams and Ferriera 2009, Benjamin E. 
Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach 2003, Shivdasani, A. 1993, Warther, V. 1998, 
Tufano, P., and M. Sevick. 1997). The most analyzed perspective linked with the 
gender diversity is the agency perspective. We must mention that it is a topic that is 
hardly approached through independency characteristics. Kiel and Nicholson, 2004 
believe that the one and only theory that explains the relation between diversity and 
performance, simply does not exist (Geoffrey C. Kiel, 2003). ‘The power of the board 
as a competitive weapon depends on the quality and the diversity of its directors’, 
(Gavin J. Nicholson, 2004). Based on this, there are three major theories that indicate 
the effect of gender diversity on the corporation’s performance, agency theory, the 
theory of resource dependency and the stakeholder theory. 
Regarding the first one, the agency theory focuses on the relation between the 
agency and the principal. To the point, it puts emphasis on the conflicts that occur 
between owners and managers, because of the asymmetry of information. These 
conflicts can lead to agency costs. Thereafter, by applying a well-structured 
corporate governance, these costs are possible to be reduced and give a strong 
boost at the performance of the organization. According to Core 2006, ‘poor 
governance causes agency costs (e.g., managerial shirking, overinvestment, and 
perquisite consumption)’, (John Core, 2006). An heterogenous board can provide a 
wider range of views, thus decreasing the possibilities for agency costs through the 
gender diversity and so increasing the possibilities for higher value of the firm. 
However, there is a great dilemma here because there is not a clear linkage between 
board diversity and firm value. Hermalin and Weisbach state that a principal-agent 
model like that may provide many insights although it can be useless for explaining 
board-specific phenomena. For example, why the ratio of insiders to outsiders 
matters or changes: or why management seems to have such influence in the 
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selection of directors (Weisbach, 2003). Nevertheless, we have to admit that most of 
the empirical research and literature publications support that if a company or 
organization achieves greater corporate diversity it promotes a better understanding 
of the marketplace, because diversity increases creativity and innovation, deals 
effectively with problem-solving, improves the effectiveness of corporate leadership 
and encourages more effective global relationships.  
The second theory, the theory of resource dependency, is one among those that 
should be considered as it associates the gender diversity with the firm’s 
performance. To be more specific, the resource dependence theory states that 
diversity can be a powerful weapon for accessing resources that are critical to the 
firm’s success and can foster its overall ability to problem-solving (Isabel Gallego – 
Alvarez, 2009). Moreover, according to this publication, another view close to the 
previous theory is the resource-based view that focuses on the synergies arising 
from the interaction of males and females and on diversity as a source of 
competitive advantage, (Isabel Gallego – Alvarez, 2009). Regarding although the 
resource dependence theory, it associates ownership and management with the 
company’s links relevant to its environment, (Reguera – Alvarado, 2015). Resources 
can diminish the dependency between the organization and external contingencies, 
lessen the risk for the firm, lower transaction costs, and finally contribute to the 
solvency of the firm, (Amy I. Hillman, 2003).  This fact puts emphasis on the board’s 
ability to extend its independency, as the members set external links and resources 
to collect vital information for the company, (Siciliano, 1996). Gender diversity has a 
crucial role in expanding the directors’ ability to improve relations with competitors, 
customers and other industrial stakeholders, giving the opportunity for more 
information about the industry and more possibilities for access to finance, (Reguera 
– Alvarado, 2015). Thereafter, the theory of resource dependency, as well as the 
agency theory, suggests the gender diversity drives to more effective organizational 
performance.  
The third theory, stakeholder theory is a perspective that emphasizes the interest of 
other stakeholders besides the shareholders (employees, investors, competitors, 
government regulation, customers, suppliers, education and financial institutions 
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and so on), something that creates value for the firm. Consequently, it is a factor 
that should be considered for the decision-making process, (Simionescu, 2015) as 
the firm has to reflect the stakeholders’ interests. At this direction, and with the 
target of maximizing the firm’s value, the existence of gender diversity on the board 
and other managerial and crucial positions is a sign of a stakeholder-oriented firm, 
(Elizabeth, 2016). 
2.1 Gender diversity on boards and corporate governance 
Reliable relations between the corporation and its interested parties such as 
employees, customers, suppliers, and their community are created thanks to good 
corporate governance. The sustainable development is founded on grounds of trust. 
The invasion of globalization in our life increased the mutual interdependence and as 
a result we take advantage of the resources and benevolence in our way to success. 
This practice can only be accomplished through ensuring their trust. In the economic 
field they key to success is the trust of global financial markets and of all the 
stakeholders in the value chain. Good corporate governance in action is characterized 
by the following qualities: consistency, responsibility, accountability, fairness, 
transparency and effectiveness. Through strategic guidance and oversight boards 
have the decisive role to ensure sustainable improvements in corporate valuations 
taking management decisions regarding their selection and change, whenever 
necessary. The board of directors constitutes the most important part of the 
governance structure, despite the fact that lineup between different interest groups 
is also partly determined by the legal framework. In a series of articles, La Porta et al. 
(1997,1998,2002) conclude that countries whose laws are based on the “common 
law” tradition (in the Anglo-Saxon countries) tend to protect investors more than 
those countries whose laws come from the “civil law” tradition. Moreover, as the 
OECD’S corporate governance factbook 2017 concludes, countries characterized by 
dispersed ownership holding share of global market capitalization do not no longer 
have the lead. After the implantation of the Principles of Corporate Governance in 
1999, the market share of countries with concentrated ownership structures has 
increased from 20% to 34%. Ownership structures in corporations can have various 
 
MSc in Internatiοnal Accοunting, Auditing and Financial 
Management 
 
[10]    Bοard Gender Diversity and firm perfοrmance 
classifications. Generally, social enterprise ownership structures can be private, public 
or collective. Ownership can be either lead or define the legal structure of a social 
entreprise. A simple separation between “concentrated” and “dispersed” ownership 
cannot be enough to thoroughly understand the various types of ownership structures 
if we take into consideration its multiple levels. Even so, in order to define the 
corporate governance standards, the degree of ownership concentration at company 
level remains a determining factor. 
Four countries (Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States) are 
generally characterized as having mostly “dispersed” ownership structures. According 
to OECD calculations based on World Bank data, the total share of global market 
capitalization aforementioned countries was diminished from 58% in the period of 
1998-2002 to 49% in the most recent period of 2013-2015. Yet, these calculations 
cannot accurately measure the intention of companies all over the world adopting 
concentrated ownership structures. For example, even if USA is considered a country 
with dispersed ownership structures at company level in their majority, many of them 
have controlling owners, such as Amazon, Berkshire Hathaway and Facebook. On the 
other hand, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Switzerland have been 
reported to make use of a “mixed” ownership structure. 
38 other OECD and non-OECD jurisdictions included in the Factbook indicate that the 
majority of companies are mostly governed by a controlling shareholder or group. 
According to OECD calculations based on World Bank data, the aggregate share of 
countries with predominantly “concentrated” ownership structures in global market 
capitalization presented and increase from 20% in the period of 1998-2002 compared 
to 34% in the recent period of 2013-2015. The growth of countries with concentrated 
ownership structures is actually based on the rapid development of capital markets in 
non-OECD G20 countries, whose share of global market capitalization increased from 
4% (1998-2002) to recently 17%. The wide variety in ownership structures of individual 
companies and the changing nature of ownership characteristics in each country are 
identified irrespectively of the country classification. The most concerning issue in 
those companies with concentrated ownership structures, are “horizontal” agency 
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problems created between controlling and minority shareholders, while “vertical” 
agency problems between managers and shareholders may be moderated 
(Vermeulen, 2013). Countries having dispersed ownership structures have also 
brought provisions in purpose of enhancing minority shareholder’s protection in the 
threat of a controlling shareholder. An example of these provisions is met in the 
United Kingdom where the Financial Conduct Authority released, in May 2014, the 
following in order to improve the effectiveness of the Listing Regime: additional voting 
power for minority shareholders when electing independent directors where a 
controlling shareholder is present; and the requirement for an agreement between 
the company and a controlling shareholder to ensure that the company operates 
independently of its controlling shareholder. On the other hand, in the United States, 
listed companies with a controlling owner having the power to act veto in the board 
election, are not required to have a majority independent board. 
Most of listed companies with concentrated ownership structures have a controlling 
shareholder. Trying to characterize a company having concentrated ownership, we 
need to keep in mind factors such as pyramid structures, family control, company 
groups, and state ownership. The table below presents some examples of ownership 
structure around the world. 
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Since listed companies of the London’s Stock Exchange are the object of our research, 
it is worth noting some initiatives taken by the U.K government regarding the female 
representation on the boardroom. 
Few years ago, in 2011, the U.K. government assigned to Lord Davies to conduct an 
independent review of women on board. He recommended that by 2015, the target 
that should be accomplished by FTSE 100 companies is a minimum of 25 percent 
female board member representation. He outlined that this target is attainable since 
companies have made significant progress to this direction. His report recommended 
that FTSE 350 companies should challenge themselves by setting higher standards and 
live up to the expectation of exceeding this minimum. In other words, they should find 
ways and acts that will lead more capable and talented women to higher- ranked job 
positions in companies across the United Kingdom. Board chairs are asked to 
communicate these goals and CEOs to reconsider the minimum percentage of women 
on their executive committees in 2013 and 2015. The U.K. Financial Reporting Council 
responded to Lord Davies’ report by releasing two revisions to the U.K. corporate 
governance code demanding companies to present and annual report on their 
boardroom diversity policies and to include gender diversity criteria in the evaluation 
of board effectiveness. These changes on corporate governance code were valid 
starting on or after October 1, 2012. The 30% Club is a group of board chairs and 
organizations committed to bringing more women onto U.K. corporate boards. Their 
work is focused on the stimulation, debate, and influence of the political agenda 
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sharing information and support of gender diversity in boardrooms along with related 
groups such as the Davies Committee. Additionally, they monitor progress making 
regarding the threshold of 30 percent female board representation by 2015. 
In March 2015, the U.K. Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills issued an 
update on progress. The report outlined an increase of 11% from 2011 regarding the 
board seats belong to women (263 or 23.5% of FTSE 100). A research of Deloitte about 
women’s participation on boardrooms globally gives us interesting results. More 
specifically, 8.6% of FTSE 100 are executive directors and 28.5% are nonexecutive 
directors. In contrast to the 12% in 2011 within the FTSE 100, 41 boards include at 
least 25% women participation. All the FTSE 100 companies have at least one female 
board member, in contrast to 21 percent all-male boards in 2011. There are still 23 all-
male boards among the FTSE 250, although there are now eight female board chairs 
in this group.  
2.2 Board gender diversity and firm performance 
The entity of the board is strengthened by the board diversity as this offers various 
opinion aspects and skills. Many important discussions take place on boards. These 
various opinion aspects presented in board with diversity limit the group thinking and 
result in fully- developed decisions. There are two types of arguments in defense of 
more female representatives in the board of directors: ethical and economic. In terms 
of fairness and gender equality in corporate boards, it is considered unethical for 
women not to be represented at the same level with me in boardrooms. The target of 
higher women participation in board of directions should not be just an obligation, but 
a continuous pursuit. On an economic basis, researchers argue that companies 
avoiding women in higher- ranked job positions may deal with a financial failure. We 
shall now continue by presenting the theory regarding companies’ precedence 
considering they include gender diversity. The writers Robinson and Dechant (1997) 
base their point of view on intuition. Despite the fact that their research is based on 
diversinty in general, including age, race and gender, we shall implement their theory 
in the gender diversity in boardrooms. Firstly, in the context of chasing new markets 
the gender diversity in boardrooms is in accordance with the gender diversity of 
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customers and employees and this means that diversified boards of director are in a 
privileged position to deeply understand markets and workforce. Therefore, someone 
would assume that the percentage of gender participation in boardrooms depends on 
industry sectors according to the cross-sector variation in the demographic 
composition of customers and employees. One unexpected finding noted by Brammer 
et al (2005) in their study of UK corporate boards is the fact women are more 
represented in industry fields that have a distance from final consumers, that are 
retailing, banking, the media and utilities-all sectors such as resources, engineering 
and business services, while as it was expected women constitute a minority in 
boardrooms whose workforce is controlled by men. Secondly, creativity and 
innovation are qualities that are highly connected with demographic indicators, such 
as gender and they are casually found in the population. Thirdly, gender diversity 
means variety of opinions and points of view that would improve the problem- solving 
process through various brainstorming. Being privileged with diversity and various 
perspectives, they could be aware of market complexities and enhance the decision- 
making process. Additionally, a firm with gender diversity in board takes a precedence 
regarding the public image of the corporation as this can have an impact to clientele, 
its promotion and finally, its performance (Smith et al., 2006). Carter et al. (2003) 
consider the link between board diversity and firm value in the context of agency 
theory, as outlined by Fama and Jensen (1983), and conclude that a firm with gender 
diversity would monitor better the managers and workforce in general. Further to 
their reasoning, women have a tendency to ask questions that would not be asked by 
male directors and this advantage could be interpreted to higher independence of the 
board. To the contrary, they argue that board diversity does not result in a better 
board monitoring as gender diversity despite the advantage of various opinions does 
not guarantee this outcome.  Undoubtedly, if directors are chosen on basis of 
qualitative criteria without any bias, its quality will be improved considering selective 
criteria shall be education, professional experience and personality. Farrell and Hersch 
(2005) note that, an advantage for women is that they can choose more successful 
companies to be a part of, since female board representation is not something 
common. This can be interpreted as a beneficiary interdependence between female 
presence and firm value, although it is also possible that the two variables are 
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endogenously defined. On the other side, our research finds arguments that shows a 
negative effect on firms with greater gender diversity. Early and Mosakowski (2000) 
suggest that members coming from homogenous groups tend to communicate better 
as they are more likely to share similar perspectives. Under the same context, Tajfel 
and Turner (1986) and Williams and O’Reilly (1998) argue that homogenous groups 
tend to cooperate better and are not often involved in conflicts. As a result, taking into 
consideration that people with difference on background, gender, age and race are 
more usually driven to disputes because of their different opinions, the process of 
decision-making will become more difficult as it would demand more time and effort. 
Across various researches, we find contradictory findings: Nowell and Tinkler (1994) 
suggest that women tend to be more cooperative than men, while Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) believe the opposite. The likelihood of disputes may be also defined 
by the tendency to altruism, women and men have. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) 
argue that men are more altruistic than women when the cost of altruism is low and 
that the opposite is true when this cost is high. Moreover, regarding the firm 
performance, Giannakopoulos and Bernasek (1998) argue that gender diversity may 
lead to lower firm performance and women are not as willing as men to take risks, 
while Cox and Blake (1991) outline that women cause higher costs to the firm as they 
are characterized by higher turnover and absenteeism. 
More gender diverse boards have also the tendency of creating smaller groups sharing 
the same opinions, e.g. “alliances under the common ground of gender.  As a result, 
this practice may lead to more frequent disputes (Richard et al., 2004). This, of course 
can create problems when quick decisions are needed in a constantly changing 
competitive environment as business market (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). 
Although a gender diverse board may take decisions characterized by higher quality, 
this may not be enough to balance the slow decision- making process that gender 
diversity may cause. (Hambrick et al., 1996). After all these various arguments, we 
assume that the effect of gender diversity cannot be determined a priori since they 
are both positive and negative and have the same gravity. In addition to the above our 
findings are based on U.S. data and on empirical observation. For example, Shrader et 
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al. (1997) investigating U.S. boards found only negative associations between gender 
diversity and firm performance in some cases as they had hard time to connect these 
factors in a positive way. Carter et al. (2003) find a positive and a meaningful 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and the percentage of women on the boards of 
Fortune 1000 firms, after monitoring size, industry and other corporate governance 
measures. Erhardt et al. (2003) agree with the previous report as they managed to 
connect positively the female representation on boards of large U.S firms with return 
on assets and the return on investment, while a report by Catalyst (2016) finds that 
Fortune 500 companies with the highest percentage of women on highly ranked job 
positions present increased returns on equity and total shareholder returns. Farrell 
and Hersch (2005) don’t identify any significant impact on stock market by the higher 
female representation and conclude that this phenomenon did not occur after actual 
need, but only because of call for greater diversity. Other researches outside U.S.A. 
such as the one conducted by Du Rietz and Henrekson (2000) shows that there is no 
connection between female participation in boards of Swedish firms and performance 
indicators such as profitability, employment or orders growth across various in size 
and industry corporations. Another two studies over Danish firms conclude to the 
same result as they could not identify any relationship between increased female 
boards seats and performance- measured factors (Smith et al. (2006) and Rose (2007).  
To the contrary, Bohren and Strom (2005) analyzing Norwegian firms assume that 
there is a negative impact of women representation on firm performance.  In a wider 
study of the 500 largest firms from three Scandinavian countries-Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden, Tobin’s Q. Randay et al. (2006) consider that gender diversity does not 
significantly affect the stock market performance or on the return on assets.  
The aforementioned conflicting results can be explained in many ways. Firstly, since 
these studies were conducted in different time periods and countries, we have to take 
into consideration that firm performance may be affected by these factors. Secondly, 
the researchers might have used various estimation methods that can justify this 
mixed evidence. In other words, all studies did not all consider the same factors such 
as size and leverage, while there must be other important indicators regarding firm 
performance that were not taken into account. Therefore, we hope that our study will 
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be more reliable using panel data and not just various studies over different industry 
sectors.  
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Historical and compliance factors that affect women representation 
on boards of directors 
The controversial topic about how women can be as directors has centered on a lot of 
questions. More specifically, there have been inquiries about whether one can find 
good women easily, whether they may have limited skills or whether their absence 
reflects cronyism and established social and cultural patterns (Pajo, McGregor and 
Cleland, 1997).  
In spite of the fact that more and more educated women are entering the workforce, 
increasing their buying power and influence, they continue to represent only a small 
proportion of leadership positions in business (Catalysts, 2004). Bradshaw & Wicks 
(2000) assert that women have all the experience, credentials or skills required in 
order to be leaders, “but they lack the demographic similarities that boardroom gate 
keepers assume will minimize social uncertainty in governance.” (Ronald J. Burke, 
(1994) "Women on Corporate Boards of Directors: Forces for Change?", Women in 
Management Review, Vol. 9 Issue: 1, pp.27-31) 
3.1.1 Hegemony 
Bradshaw and Wicks (2000) believe that hegemony is often invisible or even taken for 
granted as it has been greatly integrated in social structures and policies, dogmas and 
cultural artifacts. These authors equate the “old boys‟ club” to hegemonic manliness. 
Leighton (1993) states that the “boys‟ club” and the fact that women were excluded, 
is due to antiquated systems where well- educated and socially homogenous groups 
of white males choose as directors’ people with similar backgrounds whom they know 
and trust. Kanter (1977) called this process “homosocial reproduction” and Zajac & 
Westphal (1996) referred to it as “self-cloning”. 
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3.1.2 Recruitment 
According to US data, while it is vital that women representation in corporate 
management should increase, this increase cannot be achieved using proportionate 
representation (Burke and Mattis, 2000). Natividad (2006) reminds us that the 
director recruitment process is still an informal referral system among male directors 
by tradition. This in combination with the fact that the search for board members 
tends to focus on certain parts of the organization, specifically the line positions with 
profit and loss responsibility and overlooks others (McCall, 1998). While women are 
not proved to be less capable of pursuing managerial careers than men (Powell, 1990) 
they usually hold support roles instead of management ones that generally have a 
higher status. (Vinnicombe et al, 2000).  
Directors are more often selected for their personal, social or business ties, or even 
for their ability to add symbolic luster to a company’s board. “Think director, think 
male” characterizes the procedure which suggests that directors recruited have the 
same characteristics as their present incumbents (Kanter, 1977). Stephenson (2004) 
believes that many companies recognize the fact that diversity fosters ideas and 
learning thus establishing strategies to recruit directors coming from different cultures 
and backgrounds, (in SA, especially companies procuring services from government). 
However, males continue to dominate in boards. In the majority, they are white males 
being of the same social backgrounds and sharing the same circles of influence and 
views (Stephenson, 2004). 
3.1.3 Social stereotyping 
According to Burgess and Tharenou (1997), the limited women representation on 
Australian boards is due to social stereotyping and statistical discrimination. A 
common comment about the lack of women is that there is not a sufficient number of 
qualified women, capable of participating in boards (Elgart, 1983, McGregor, 1997), 
while the lack of profile and visibility of women has been suggested as a problem 
(Mattis, 1993). In workplace, stereotypes based on gender can be really harmful. The 
research conducted by Catalyst (2005) called Women „Take Care‟, Men „Take Charge‟ 
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exposed that stereotyping still exists amongst U.S. business leaders perpetrated by 
both men and women. Stereotypes can hinder women’s advancement, setting 
obstacles to acquire leadership positions. Catalysts (2005) concludes that these 
obstacles are due to the common beliefs that portray women to lack the qualities 
commonly associated with effective leadership.  
3.1.4 Shareholder activism 
Shareholders can impose their authority even if they do not run a company and they 
are often able to affect a corporation’s decisions by exercising their rights as owners. 
They can influence both board of directors and management in many ways; from 
expressing their concerns about an issue by holding a dialogue, to submitting formal 
proposals at a company's annual meetings.   
Good governance is a mixture of the enforceable and intangible (Wagner, S. and 
Dittmar, L., 2006). Currently, there is no penalty in case women are excluded from 
corporate boards (Burke, 1994b), but more and more investors and shareholder 
associations are exerting pressure to boards so that they will increase woman 
representation, especially in managerial positions (Investor Responsibility Research 
Center, 1993). Institutional investors and shareholder activists are increasingly 
pressurizing companies to choose directors with diverse backgrounds assuming that 
the greater managerial diversity is the better board decision-making will be achieved 
(Westphal & Milton, 2000, p.366). 
3.2 Environmental factors that affect the configurations of boards of 
directors 
The board of directors is a group of individuals having diverse backgrounds and 
characteristics who act as a link between the owners or the shareholders and their 
agents. They are legitimately appointed by shareholders, having as their main duty to 
monitor the management and provide advice (Truong, 2006). In other words, boards 
of directors act independently from managers and they monitor them in order ensure 
that the latter do not pursue their own interest at the expense of other shareholders 
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(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1986). Boards of directors account for 
the company’s performance as well as its strategic movements and its internal control. 
Strategy comprises company’s plans to achieve its goals and each strategic movement 
should be in alignment with the characteristics of each organization. As demonstrated 
in the figure 3 below, strategy serves as a link between the organization and its 
environment.  
As far as strategic thinking is concerned, it involves a thorough analysis of a 
corporation related to its industry, its competitors and its environment in both the 
short-term and the long one (Collis & Montgomery, 2005). That is why, each board 
member should meet the strategy of a corporation, something which suggests that 
the board comprise a group of individuals with diverse skills, knowledge and 
experience. (Conger, Finegold and Lawler, 1998a). Undoubtedly, the success of any 
corporation is determined by the quality of its leadership (Adam & Khoza, 2005). 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
In 1932, Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means established the agency theory and noted 
the consequences of the separation of ownership and control, which are that 
shareholders (owners) typically want to maximize earnings, whilst managers (agents) 
want to maximize the firm size (Collis & Montgomery, 2005). Agency theory argues 
that when given decision rights, self-interested managers may take decisions that 
serve their own interest acting at the expense of the company’s good. Collis & 
Montgomery (2005) suggest that monitoring and control systems should arise in order 
to avoid the dangers of wrong decision makings. According to Colley, Jr. et al (2003), 
all those being would-be members of the board must have integrity and morality, as 
shareholders give them the authority to act on their behalf.  (Colley, Jr. et al, 2003). 
Boards of directors connect the shareholders of a firm with the managers which are 
in charge for the function of the firm (Monks & Minow, 1995).  
The board of directors, no matter which the type of the organization will be, should 
have all the important skills and experience in order to help company achieve its goals 
and objectives (Colley, Jr. et al, 2003).  
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Burke (2000) clarifies that boards are responsible for affecting strategic decisions and 
monitoring managers’ strategic movements, but they have nothing to do with the 
implementation of these decisions for the administration of the corporation. The 
rationale for a structure of boards of directors and the role that they play in 
organizations, according to Burke (2000), is the belief that a group of people with 
diverse knowledge, experience and skills is better than a single member. The poet Ezra 
Pound once said, “When two men in business always agree, one of them is 
unnecessary”. There are a lot of times when board members prefer to exercise an 
advisory role rather than a monitoring one. Firstly, this is because CEO and/or 
management are those who appoint directors, thus making them feel uncomfortable 
to evaluate the people who nominate them, particularly when management 
performance is substandard (Johnson, Daily, Ellstrand, 1996).  
3.2.2 Board responsibilities 
According to Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998), the most important activities and 
responsibilities of corporate boards are the following:   
• Being responsible for business strategy development.  
• Being in charge of seeing that the company has the highest caliber Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and executive team and senior managers are being prepared so that they 
will become the next CEO.  
• Ensuring that senior management is well informed about whether the company is 
meeting its goals and conforming to external legal and ethical standards and its own 
values. 
3.2.3 Board profile 
Board composition is a serious concern as it plays a key role in framing the balance 
of power between company managers and directors. The composition of boards 
varies from country to country as no company is wholly insulated from its political or 
economic environment. The discernible characteristics of board structure are made 
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of the board size, leadership, committees, skill sets and diversity. Few years ago, 
there was a general belief that board seats were premium assignments, bringing 
status and financial rewards, but not requiring a lot of effort. Yet, directors 
nowadays face increased legal liability for negligence and thus a heavier workload. 
Nadler et al (2006) express concern that just when boards need them, the most, 
highly qualified, independent directors are getting harder to find especially as new 
corporate governance principles require most of board members to be outside (non-
executive) directors and to adhere to a stricter definition of independence. As a 
result, the search is no longer amongst “the usual suspects” with business 
connections with the company and its CEO. In addition, a major change is that the 
nomination process is no longer under the control of the CEO, but the nomination 
committee composed of independent directors. Therefore, appointing outside board 
members in no longer an informal and incestuous process (Nadler et al, 2006) which 
opens opportunities for women to be invited onto boards. Leaving in an era in which 
the demand for women board members significantly exceeds supply Burke (1994c) 
states that not enough women have sufficient business and executive experience as 
they have chosen career paths which do not lead to board selection. Too many 
women have chosen staff jobs instead of line management (Mattis, 1993) which are 
not usually targeted when recruiting for board positions. This is an era of triple 
bottom-line reporting, the “softer” considerations should not be removed from 
discussions of corporate strategy and direction as they are in fact hallmarks of 
enduring corporate success (King Report 2). Executive search firms are flourishing 
because of the demand for leadership talent (Charan, Drotter & Noel, 2001). This 
war for talent is an indication that there has been a lack of effective talent 
development within organizations which has contributed to the leadership deficit. 
There is a need for companies to focus on intervention strategies to promote equity 
at board level. Women, however, do not always have access to the experiences that 
would best develop their executive abilities, so organizations need some mechanism 
or process that determines who gets what experience (McCall and Hollenbeck, 
1998). All these changes and interventions should open opportunities for women on 
boards, including those in support roles. 
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3.3 Studies in women representation on boards of directors around the 
world 
The available literature, which examines women corporate directors, is small, 
scattered and piece-meal (Burke, 1994; Burke and Mattis, 1997). This is a common 
characteristic of studies focusing in new areas of reasearch. Data exist 
predominantly from the USA, Australia, Canada, UK, New Zealand (NZ), and SA and 
in the recent years from Scandinavian countries and are highlighted in this literature 
review. Some countries have investigated women‟s progress more systematically 
than others (Catalyst, 2003, 2005; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2005). 
The Catalyst census 2004 found that women on boards of directors in Australia were 
8.4%, in the USA 13.6%, and in Canada 11.2%. Singh and Vinnicombe (2003) 
observed that in the Scandanavian countries, in early 2002, ministers proposed 
legislation if private companies did not have at least 40% of female representation 
on their boards by 2005. Whereas in May 2002, women comprised 7.5% of directors 
in the top 300 companies, in a pre-emptive response to the threat of legislation, by 
2003, women held 18.8% of all top 100 company directorships and 10.7% of 
executive positions (Singh and Vinnicombe, 2003). 
3.3.1 USA 
Catalyst (2005) which has been conducting benchmarking research on women on 
boards since 1993 found that in the USA, although women make up more than 45% of 
the US workforce, they were managers in only seven Fortune 500 companies and only 
ten Fortune 501 – 1000 companies. Catalyst (2005) observes that while women appear 
more and more in the economy as business owners, investors, employers and 
employees or consumers, they do not have the same access to corporate boardroom 
in US companies. More specifically, as consumers, women are responsible for over 80 
percent of all purchases of goods and services (Popcorn & Business Women's Network, 
2001). As investors, they represent over 45 percent of all investors (National 
Association of securities Dealers, 2001) and as managers, they consist of over half of 
all financial managers and accountants in the US (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1999). 
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Similarly, as company owners, they possess over ten million companies (over 45 
percent of all US companies). (Center for Women's Business Research, 2003). 
However, although more and more women possess director seat, progress is still slow. 
(Catalyst, 2003).  
Fairfax (2005) contributes to the representation of women on boards‟ literature by 
breaking down the marginalised groupings further. She compares the representation 
of women with that on people of color, concluding that both have experienced some 
increase in board representation as time passes. Yet, the people of color, especially 
women of color, seem to have experienced the most significant obstacles. Fairfax 
(2005) highlights the irony in the fact that women have progressed better than the 
people of color even though the women‟s entry into board ranks was advanced in 
part by the struggles of people of color during the Civil Rights Movement. In 2003 and 
2004, people of color held 10% of board seats at Fortune 500 companies. This 
percentage is relatively low if it is compared to that of people of color in the labour 
force where they are 30% (Fairfax, 2005).   
3.3.2 United Kingdom 
In the UK, in 2004, women accounted for 10% of FTSE 100 board positions and 4% of 
executive and 13% of non -executive directors (Female FTSE Report 2004: Cranfield 
School of Management). Thomson and Graham (2005) present breakthrough research 
concerning the real reasons why there are so few women as executive and non-
executive directors in the UK. The authors use discussions with Chairmen and CEOs 
from both FTSE 100 and Fortune 500 companies, who are those nominating board 
members, reaching the conclusion that there is no conspiracy or deliberate attempt 
to keep women from the managerial positions.  
Thomson and Graham (2005) found that there are a lot of reasons why there are only 
a few women in managerial positions. These reasons interact in many ways being 
either historical or organizational. Some others have to do with differences prevailing 
in society concerning male and female minds. That means that there are differences 
in the way males and females think, act and deal with various situations. One cannot 
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ignore the deep-rooted roles assigned to women by nature and society, which 
contribute to their scarcity at the top of companies (Thomson and Graham, 2005, p.3).  
Many CEOs and Chairmen interviewed expressed the benefits of having women in 
managerial positions. Thomson & Graham (2005) conclude that if women were given 
the opportunity to participate more actively in companies’ guidance and governance, 
there would be more economic growth and development. 
3.3.3 New Zealand  
Jayne (2005) says that women constitute almost half of NZ's workforce and even 
though they also dominate tertiary graduation statistics; they are still not adequately 
represented in public company boardrooms. Jayne (2005) asserts that women 
currently hold about one in every 20 directorships. 
According to Jayne (2005), in NZ, the women representation divide is between the 
public and the private sectors. The Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit 
(CCMAU) plays a key role with regards to governance processes for state-owned 
enterprises. The CCMAU had in the past used general advertising as a means of 
characterizing applicants, but this brought up unsatisfactory because many names 
were gathered of people who always wished to be directors, but most were not 
appropriate, and the process tended to raise expectations which could not be readily 
fulfilled (Adam & Khoza, 2005). Jayne (2005) attributes the higher proportion of 
women representation in public companies to the fact that the Former Prime 
Minister, Jenny Shipley championed affirmative action in Crown companies resulting 
in the number of women directors reaching 35 percent in 2005. Jenny Shipley 
pushed for gender and ethnic representation on government boards and 
committees so that they reflect NZ's demographic makeup. The political will to 
increase women representation on boards continues under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Women's Affairs which operates a Nominations Service that keeps the 
issue of women representation on government bodies high on the agenda and has a 
target of 50 percent women representation by 2010 (Jayne, 2005). 
4. Research Methodology 
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4.1 Data and methodology 
4.1.1 The dataset 
Our dataset includes 139 UK observations of non-financial firms listed in the London 
Stock Exchange, being analyzed for a 5-year period (2012-2016). For obtaining our 
final sample we applied a selection procedure including several filters. Below, we are 
describing them step by step. First, financial firms were decided to be excluded as 
their financial statements have a specific structure that does not allow for comparing 
to the statements of other firms. Secondly, we decided to include in our sample 
those entities that have positive current market capitalization as we apply a Tobin’s 
Q regression. Third, we eliminated those observations with outliers for any variables 
considered through the time under our empirical study. Continuously, we collected 
those firms that were headquartered in United Kingdom and had female presence 
percentage (on Board of Directors) information published for at least one year of the 
period under investigation. Finally, we decided to focus on a specific country (UK) as 
we use country information (as GDP) for the regression to take into consideration 
law and economic crisis effects on firms’ financial performance. 
The financial information of the companies was gathered from Amadeus and 
Thomson Eikon Reuters databases. Moreover, data on the composition of the board 
of directors regarding the gender characteristics, were derived from the corporate 
governance report of each company analyzed. Individual financial statements have 
been used in the case of non-consolidated financial statements. The figure 1 below, 
shows the sample by sector. 
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Since our research is related to the gender diversity and the presence of females in 
the Board of Directors, the following table provides information about the 
percentage of women representation in BOD annually for the years between 2012 
and 2016: 
Table 1: Firms with published percentage of female presence in BOD 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number of Firms 121 124 123 135 138 
Mean Female Percentage 12.90% 15.15% 19.55% 19.73% 21.30% 
 
It is of major importance to mention that although the percentage of female 
presence in the boardroom seems to increase from 2012 to 2016, the number of the 
firms with published information relevant to gender characteristics increases too. 
This was one of the difficulties that we faced, as we cannot be sure about the actual 
reason of female percentage incensement. However, what is observable through the 
table 1 is that the number of firms’ growth rate is typically lower than the female 
percentage one. Without doubt, this table confirms the women’s under-
representation in the boardroom, which is in line with the ‘WOMEN IN UK 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 2016, by Yasmine Chinwala, 2016, regarding women’ 
underrepresentation. Comparing 2012 to 2016, the percentage of women presence 
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was increased by 8.4%. Generally, these results demonstrate that in UK, there is still 
minimal presence of women on boards. Unfortunately, we had not the opportunity 
to find the exact number of men in boardrooms, so we moved through their 
proportionate percentage, which seems to decrease from year to year. According to 
a 2016 review of 1,000 listed companies by Bloomberg, the average representation 
of women in the leadership was 23% in senior management, 21% on boards, 4% 
have a female chairperson, and 3% have a female CEO’, (LSEG, March 1, 2017 New 
York).  
4.1.2 Variable description  
The approaches applied by previous studies and researches regarding the 
measurement of the financial performance and its relation to women’s presence on 
the Board of Directors vary a lot. The main well-identified approaches are the 
following: studies using accounting data as base for measurements and researchers 
using Tobin’s Q. Comparing these two choices, we decided to use Tobin’s Q 
approach (TOBINSQ) as a searching measurement for our firms’ financial 
performance. The formal definition of Tobin’s Q ratio is as follows: Q Ratio= Firm’s 
Total Market Value/ Firm’s Total Asset Value. Obviously, if Q is higher than 1, the 
firm is worthy for investment. If Q ratio is between 0 and 1, this means that the cost 
to replace a firm’s assets is greater than the value of the stock, which consequently 
is undervalued (Investopedia). On the other hand, a high Tobin’s Q ratio leads to the 
fact that the firm’s stock is overvalued as it is more expensive than the assets’ 
replacement cost. So, we concluded that it is a representative proxy for the stock 
valuation and of course a major driving factor for investment decision making. It 
measures the company’s competitive advantage as it indicates the market’s forecast 
of future earnings (Montgomery and Wernerfelt 1988). Thereafter, higher value of 
Tobin’s Q ratio means higher financial performance for the firm. In accordance with 
several studies such as Lopez and Morros 2014; Coles et al. 2008; Fich and Shivdasani 
2006; Haniffa and Hudaib 2006; Ferris et al.2003, we decided to follow the same 
path.  
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To compare the presence of women in the boardroom to the total number of 
members, we created the TAMCAD variable. TAMCAD measures the board size (total 
number of members) and to continue our study we examine how this is relativized 
to the women’s percentage in the BOD. Using as guideline the research methodology 
applied in the article: ‘Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance? 
Evidence from Spain’, by Nuria Reguera-Alvarado, Pilar de Fuentes and Joaquina 
Laffarg, 2014 (even though it is a research for Spanish Companies), we created three 
variables as proxies for the description of gender diversity in the boardroom. The 
first one is the PWOMEN variable, which measures the women’s presence in the 
board of directors in a percentage form. Thereupon, according to Reguera 2015 
(Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from 
Spain’, by Nuria Reguera-Alvarado, Pilar de Fuentes and Joaquina Laffarg, 2014) as 
well as Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008), we calculate two further variables that 
take into consideration the distribution evenness of the boardroom’s members 
between the two gender categories (male and female). At this point, we have to 
mention that while in the ‘guide – article’ (Does Board Gender Diversity Influence 
Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain’, by Nuria Reguera-Alvarado, Pilar de 
Fuentes and Joaquina Laffarg, 2014) these two measurements are calculated as 
proxies for the gender diversity and combines them in one variable, in our study we 
choose to use them as two separate variables for our regression. Analyzing them, 
according to Stirling 1998, we try to combine the two categories of gender diversity 
and their distribution in the boardroom to examine the variety or the balance in it. 
The first variable is the Blau Index, which is calculated by the following equation: 
Blau Index = 1 - ∑ ∗ 𝑷𝒊
𝟐 𝒏𝒊=𝟏 , where Pi is the percentage of board members in each one 
of the two categories (male and female), and n is the total number of board 
members. Blau Index can seems as valued between 0 and 0.5 (maximum), with 0.5 
meaning that the number of women and men is the same. The second variable is the 
Shannon Index, which is calculated as follows: Shannon Index= -𝜮𝒊=𝟏
𝒏 𝑷𝒊 𝒍𝒏𝑷𝒊, where 
Pi and n have the same meaning as in Blau Index. Shannon index ranges between 0 
and 0.69, with 0.69 as maximum value and meaning equal presence of men and 
women in the boardroom. In addition to these, we decided to include eight more 
variables in our research. Initially, in accordance with Navarro and Martinez (2004) 
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and posterior Reguera 2015 (Does Board Gender Diversity Influence Financial 
Performance? Evidence from Spain’, by Nuria Reguera-Alvarado, Pilar de Fuentes 
and Joaquina Laffarg, 2014), we calculate the LNTAB variable which is used as a 
proxy for the firm’s size and is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets for 
each one of the firms of our sample. Secondly, we decided to turn our interest to 
operating revenue (sales). Consequently, the next variable used is LNOPR which is 
calculated as the natural logarithm of operating revenue. Operating revenue is 
revenue (sales) generated from a company’s daily business activities, which means 
revenue coming from selling the company’s products or services (Investopedia – 
Operating Revenue). Our next step combines two ratios, so we decided not to 
include EPS (Earnings per Share) as a variable, which is a key ratio for evaluating a 
firm’s stock price, but operating revenue as it is a primary source for EPS calculation. 
The two ratios mentioned above are ROA and ROE, which represent two variables 
respectively. Higher ROA means higher profitability and gives an idea about how 
efficient management is at using the firm’s assets to generate earnings. Combining it 
with percentage of women in boardroom and the previous variables we examine its 
contribution to Tobin’s Q configuration (Does Gender Matter? Female 
Representation on Corporate Boards and Firm Financial Performance - A Meta-
Analysis, Jan Luca Pletzer, * Romina Nikolova,3,4 Karina Karolina 
Kedzior,4,5 and Sven Constantin Voelpel, 2015). Similarly, ROE is used as a 
profitability index which explains the relation between the capital provided by the 
shareholders of the firm and the profit derived from the effective exploitation of this 
capital. Consequently, it is relative to the effective management. Furthermore, as in 
Reguera 2015, to take into consideration, the effect of the economic crisis on a UK 
firm’s financial performance, we decided to include a variable named GDP, obviously 
representing the country’s annual GDP and one more named UNERATE representing 
the annual unemployment rate of United Kingdom. Finally, we define two more 
variables: the lagged variable named LAG_TOBINSQ, which is used in order to 
examine the endogeneity as well, and the dummy variable RECOMVDUMMY. The 
last one, is designated according to the mean of the women’ percentage of presence 
in the board of directors. The benchmark is 0.25. To be more specific, we found that 
according to Lord Davies’ report (2015), UK FTSE 100 firms’ presence of women had 
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reached 25% since 2015, a target that set by Lord Davies in 2011. So, we decided to 
use it as milestone, taking into consideration the UK law, (GOV.UK, Lord Davies: FTSE 
350 boards should be 33% female by 2020, October 2015). 
4.1.3 Instrumental Variables 
As previously mentioned, and according to literature sources (Adams and Ferreira 
2009; Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008), there are problems related to 
endogeneity, existing between a firm’s financial performance and the presence of 
women in positions of major importance. This lead as to examine how gender 
diversity affects the financial position. We decided to use instrumental variables 
correlated with the women’ presence in BOD. Consequently, we had to define and 
select these instruments among the variables of the main equation. It is worth 
mentioning that there was a substantial straightness in our methodology as the 
variables to be selected were already existing, making our ‘choice’ decisive for the 
results. According to Stock, James H.; Trebbi, Francesco (2003). "Retrospectives: 
Who Invented Instrumental Variable Regression? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 17 (3): 177–194 the method of instrumental variables is used to 
identify causality and endogeneity problems when a treatment is not successfully 
delivered to every unit in a randomized experiment. A valid instrument induces 
changes in the explanatory variable but has no independent effect on the dependent 
variable, allowing a researcher to uncover the causal effect of the explanatory 
variable on the dependent variable. 
According to Baum (2006) and Reguera 2015, an instrumental variable is considered 
as valid if it is not correlated with the error term of the main performance equation, 
except through control variables included in the regression and if it is correlated with 
the endogenous variables (PWOMEN, BLAU, SHANNON)’. Under these conditions, 
we decided to set as instrumental variable the LAG_TOBINSQ, standing up for the 
hypothesis stating that if the endogenous variables affect the LAG_TOBINSQ, it is 
expected to act in this way in a future level of several years.  
4.1.4 Methodology 
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As previously mentioned, this study is based on the Reguera 2015 article. Therefore, 
we decided to apply a methodology including steps like those suggested. To examine 
the influence of the board’s gender diversity on the financial performance of the 
firm, we implemented a two-stage instrumental variable regression. Regarding the 
first stage of this methodology, the instrumental variable regression (IV) is based on 
an Ordinary Least Squares analysis (OLS), examining how each one of the 
independent variables affect the independent one (TOBINSQ). Regarding the second 
stage of our research, we apply two tests: the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) and the two-stage least squares analysis (2SLS) which will be analyzed in a 
subsequent stage. The target is to examine the possibility of endogeneity and 
causality existence related to relations between the women percentage of presence 
in the boardroom and the financial position of the firm. To address this concern, 
GMM test is applied for examining the endogenously determined factors, Baum et al 
(2007). Throughout the implementation of the two-stage instrumental variable 
analysis, we conclude to the following equation which includes all the selected 
variables, considered as determinant for a firm’s financial performance:  
TOBINSQ = β0 + β1 X PWOMENit + β2 X BLAUit + β3 X SHANNONit + β4 X LNTABit+ β5 X 
LNOPRit+ β6 X ROAit+ β7 X ROEit + β8 X GDPit + β9 X UNERATEit + β10 X LAG_TOBINSQit + 
β11 X RECOMVDUMMYit + εit 
where i represents each one of our sample’s firms and t means time (each one of the 
years under investigation), TOBINSQ measures the firm’s performance, PWOMEN, 
BLAU and SHANNON are used as proxies for the description of women’ presence in 
the boardroom, LNTAB is the company size, LNOPR is the company’s operating 
revenue, ROA is the company’s return on assets ratio, ROE is the firm’s return on 
equity ratio, GDP is the variation of UK gross domestic product through the 5 years 
(it is the same for all the firms), UNERATE is the variation of UK unemployment rate 
through the 5 years, LAG_TOBINSQ is the lagged of the variable TOBINSQ and 
RECOMVDUMMY is the dummy variable relevant to the 25% percentage proposed 
by Lord Davies.  
The methods implemented and performed for examining the endogeneity and 
causality existence under this analysis are GMM, and 2SLS. The results of these two 
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methods are addressed according to three tests: the Durbin, Hausman and GMM 
statistic (tests of endogeneity and orthogonality conditions).  
Continuously, a panel data approach allows for the analysis of the constant term. 
This term is relative to the firm’s characteristics and aims to more efficient 
estimates. ‘A key element in panel data is the relation between the fixed effects 
term and the other explanatory variables’, Reguera 2015.  
5. Results 
5.1 Evaluation of the results  
 
 
The panel of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample (139 firms). It is 
impressive that the level of women underrepresentation in the board of directors in 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
       
 sum tobinsq tamcad pwomen blau shannon lntab lnopr roa roe gdp unerate lag_tobinsq recomvdummy 
          
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
    
tobinsq 693 1.341273 1.150146 0.018000 9.440000 
    
tamcad 684 8.785088 2.047535 3.000000 17.000000 
    
pwomen 640 0.178703 0.106834 0.000000 0.500000 
    
blau 642 0.273079 0.141378 0.000000 1.000000 
    
shannon 555 0.486528 0.105940 0.287000 0.693000 
    
lntab 694 14.501730 1.442230 11.370000 18.950000 
    
lnopr 694 14.254620 1.560110 10.438570 19.027150 
    
roa 694 7.530927 9.367902 -55.930000 39.450000 
    
roe 694 15.383530 34.645770 -355.430000 208.900000 
    
gdp 694 2.058357 0.581188 1.310000 3.070000 
    
unerate 694 6.410173 1.201939 4.900000 7.980000 
    
lag_tobinsq 694 1.328696 1.169680 0.018000 9.440000 
    
recomvdummy 694 0.344380 0.475509 0.000000 1.000000 
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the firms under investigation, which is determined by the approximately 0.2%, an 
obviously low percentage. The average board size is 9 directors in the boardroom 
with a range between 3 and 17. This measurement includes the number of women. 
The average firm size is 14.5% with a range between 11 and 19. As we can see from 
the information provided through the above table, the standard deviation 
measurement is low enough for most of the variables, except ROE and ROA (34.64 
and 9.38 respectively). This indicates that the data points are spread out over a 
wider range of values. To understand it in a better way, we provide the following 
feature that shows exactly what is the reason for such standard deviation concluded 
calculations. Regarding the operating revenue (LNOPR), the mean is calculated to 
14.25% while it is really close to the median (14.73%) which is calculated for 
comparison reasons, but not presented in this panel.  
Figure 2: Kernel density estimate
 
In statistics, kernel density estimation (KDE) is a non-parametric way to estimate the 
probability density function of a random variable. It is a fundamental data smoothing 
problem where inferences about the population are made, based on a finite data 
sample (Wikipedia). The objective is to visualize the shape of the distribution.  
Density plots can be thought of as plots of smoothed histograms. The smoothness is 
controlled by a bandwidth parameter (0.0668) that is analogous to the histogram 
bandwidth. 
Figure 3: Normal Probability plot of the residuals 
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Furthermore, regarding the distribution and the regression analysis, as we can 
understand from the normal probability plot of the residuals provided by the Figure 
3 above, it is approximately linear supporting the condition that the error terms are 
normally distributed (Chambers et al., 1983). We decided to use this technique in 
order to investigate whether or not our data set is approximately normally 
distributed. As we can see, the data are plotted in such a way that the points form an 
approximately straight line. Although there are some points that deviate from this 
line and range between 0.5 and 4 as addressed according to the Residuals vertical 
dimension, we decided to focus on the main formed line. 
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Finally, in order to analyze the statistic relationship existing between the variables 
used, we provide results in the panel of Table 2, coming from the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient analysis (PCC). Also referred as Pearson’s r, it is a measure of 
the linear correlation between the variables. It has a value ranging from -1 to +1, 
where +1 is total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear correlation and -1 is total 
negative linear correlation. The most relevant relations appear between the 
variables used as proxies for the gender diversity and between TOBINSQ and LNTAB, 
LNOPR, ROA, ROE and LAG_TOBINSQ. The correlation between the proxies for 
gender diversity is being justified through the following analysis, where we examine 
the endogeneity and causality problems. Consequently, this correlation does not 
disturb our results, supporting this even more if we keep in mind that the variables’ 
coefficients are very small.  
5.2 Evaluation of the regression 
The regression derived from our analysis, as well as the coefficients are the 
following:  
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TOBINSQ = 0.6853431 + 1.479136 X PWOMENit + (-3.5352) X BLAUit + 1.831123 X 
SHANNONit + (-0.0945) X LNTABit+ 0.04481 X LNOPRit+ 0.019668 X ROAit+ (-0.00054) 
X ROEit + (-0.0108788) X GDPit + 0.0270366 X UNERATEit + 0.7720087 X 
LAG_TOBINSQit + (-0.0312155) X RECOMVDUMMYit + εit 
This is a regression with multiple independent variables. Each of the coefficients 
indicates how much the dependent variable (TOBINSQ) is expected to increase or 
decrease, when every independent variable change by 1, holding all the other 
independent variables constant. Consequently, the firm’s financial performance is 
expected to be most positively affected by the percentage of women in the board of 
directors (PWOMEN) and the Shannon index (SHANNON), both of which were used 
as proxies for the gender diversity. On the other hand, Tobin’s Q seems to be 
negatively affected mainly by Blau index (BLAU) and the size of the firm (LNTAB). It is 
reasonable, if we keep in mind that Tobin’s Q ratio is calculated if we divide the Total 
Market Value of the Firm with the Total Asset Value. Tobin’s Q and Total Assets are 
inversely proportional amounts.  
5.3 Instrumental Variables Evaluation  
Since we mentioned that there are endogeneity and causality problems that have to 
be examined as in previous literature, we decided to implement 2 endogeneity 
analysis and evaluate the results according to 3 endogeneity and orthogonality tests. 
Both of the analysis is based on the hypothesis that the lagged tobinsq was so far 
affected by the three proxy variables related to the gender diversity in boardrooms. 
So, the null hypothesis that corroborates the presence of endogeneity is: 
Ho: If the lagged tobinsq (LAG_TOBINSQ) is so far affected by PWOMEN, SHANNON 
and BLAU (the three proxies), then there is endogeneity. 
The first analysis is 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis) and the 
results are depicted in the following panel. 
Table 4: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression                                     Number of obs =     554 
 
    
Wald chi2(8) =962.49 
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Prob>chi2 =0.0000 
 
    
R-squared = 0.7238 
 
    
Root MSE = 0.61038 
 
       
tobinsq Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
lag_tobinsq 0.37657630 0.53458030 0.70000000 0.48100000 -0.67118180 1.42433400 
lntab -0.18148520 0.12823900 -1.42000000 0.15700000 -0.43282900 0.06985860 
lnopr 0.06406960 0.04736670 1.35000000 0.17600000 -0.02876740 0.15690660 
roa 0.05125680 0.04271960 1.20000000 0.23000000 -0.03247200 0.13498570 
roe -0.00293240 0.00343130 -0.85000000 0.39300000 -0.00965760 0.00379290 
gdp 0.02313380 0.06872880 0.34000000 0.73600000 -0.11157220 0.15783980 
unerate 0.00817000 0.03428810 0.24000000 0.81200000 -0.05903340 0.07537340 
recomvdummy 0.04305040 0.12039820 0.36000000 0.72100000 0.19292570 0.27902640 
_cons 2.12866000 1.87087500 1.14000000 0.25500000 -1.43818700 5.79550700 
 
We can observe from the Table 4 that the R-squared is calculated as 72.38%, 
meaning that the model is well-structured and defined. We set LAG_TOBINSQ as 
instrumented and PWOMEN, SHANNON and BLAU as instrumental variables. 
Through the Durbin and Hausman tests, we concluded to the following p – values: 
Table 5: Results of Durbin and Hausman Tests 
 
Durbin Score =0.794223  p-value: 0.3728 
Wu-Hausman  =0.781007 p-value: 0.3772 
 
The results confirm the theoretical argument, and suggest that the tree variables of 
gender diversity influence the financial performance of the firms for the years under 
investigation. This conclusion is derived from the low p-values as appear in Table 5. 
Durbin and Hausman test for endogeneity by using the null hypothesis that the 
instrumental variables are exogenous. Because of small enough p-value this 
hypothesis is being rejected. On the other hand, we accept the null hypothesis set in 
our research (Ho).  
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However, we based our methodology on Reguera 2015, we did not follow all the 
steps as described in this article as its aim is not only to evaluate but also to predict. 
For this purpose, it suggests estimation of the instrumental variables, something that 
is not being applied in this study.  
The second analysis is GMM (Generalized Method of Moments), and the results are 
as shown in the following table:  
Table 6: GMM regression 
 
    
Instrumental variables (GMM) regression                Number of obs =     554 
 
  
                                                       Wald chi2(8) = 410.78 
 
  
                                                       Prob > chi2   = 0.0000 
 
  
                                                       R-squared     = 0.7264 
 
GMM weight matrix: Robust                              Root MSE      = 0.60755 
 
       
       
             |               Robust 
     
tobinsq Coef. Std.Err. z  P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
lag_tobinsq 0.31824912 0.36502940 1.05000000 0.29500000 -0.33295330 1.09793600 
lntab -0.18043850 0.08990560 -2.01000000 0.04500000 -0.35665020 -0.00422680 
lnopr 0.06372370 0.04173710 1.53000000 0.12700000 -0.01807950 0.14552680 
roa 0.05139000 0.02974390 1.73000000 0.08400000 -0.00690710 0.10968700 
roe -0.00299650 0.00249010 -1.20000000 0.22900000 -0.00787710 0.00188410 
gdp 0.02182270 0.05477770 0.40000000 0.69000000 -0.08553960 0.12918500 
unerate 0.00807520 0.02773570 0.29000000 0.77100000 -0.04628570 0.06243610 
recomvdummy 0.04030230 0.08638380 0.47000000 0.64100000 -0.12900680 0.20961140 
_cons 2.11583100 1.28981400 1.64000000 0.10100000 -0.41215740 4.64382000 
 
As well as the previous table, Table 6 appears a representative R-squared of 72.64%. 
The results are being evaluated by using the GMM Statistic p-value (p-value=0.0781), 
which seems even better than the Hausman’s and Durbin Score.  
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Therefore, we conclude to the confirmation of our theoretical background 
supporting that women presence in BOD affects the corporation’s financial 
performance. 
5.4 Limitations  
In this study, the limitations that should be addressed are really important. To begin 
with, as far as the sample is concerned, it comes from large UK corporations. That 
means that there is the potential danger that the results may not generalize to smaller 
companies. So, it is vital that further research be carried out to address diversity at 
board of director levels as well as its influence on organizational performance for 
smaller companies. Nevertheless, similar results are expected also in smaller 
companies, as in these cases individual efforts are more noticeable, thus making 
diversity have greater effects.  
Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to understand whether diversity also 
causes different behavior or not. The results only suggest that diversity is positively 
related to organizational performance. The research approach used in the present 
study is not enough so that one can understand behavioral differences. As a result, 
other approaches are needed such as participant observation and ethnography of 
executive boards of directors and corporate officers.  
Moreover, in this study, it is stated that there is a linear relationship between diversity 
and organizational performance. Nonetheless, one could not determine how diversity 
influenced performance. This is mainly because the representation of women and 
minorities was limited, thus preventing us from reaching safe conclusions. For 
example, if there were more data concerning women and minorities representation, 
this linear relationship between diversity and performance could change to a 
curvilinear one because of the increasing representation. As a consequence, to the 
above, the board diversity is considered a temporal advantage adopted by our 
construction regarding the more effective decision- making and innovation of diverse 
boards. However, the results could be the opposite. That is, the wider board diversity 
could originate from higher levels of ROA and ROE as company managers are more 
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confident and thus receptive to more diverse board appointments. The chosen 
variables could confine the study, as well as the fact that we are based on their 
temporal effects on each other. Our key study comes from the Fortune data including 
a two- year experience on these firms. The performance indicators were chosen at the 
same time and five years before the diversity indicators. Causality was not the final 
end, but the purpose was to record possible trends. In this context, our study goal is 
not perfect, though it a result of our keenness. Although the evidence that we 
processed to come to a conclusion were quite accessible and simple, we have come 
across other studies on the relationship between diversity and performance using 
resources such as Fortune magazine (e.g. Murray, 1989; Catalyst, 1993; Daily et al., 
1999). 
6. Conclusions 
This study is based on the literature concerning board diversity and firm financial 
performance. Most studies used data from a few economies in order to reach 
conclusions on board gender diversity. However, it is essential one be cautious before 
generalizing the results. This study used data from UK companies in order to examine 
the relationship between board gender diversity and firm value and reach some 
interesting results. United Kingdom is a country with a highly liquid listed company 
sector with dispersed ownership. The Uk is also a country where there have been only 
a few women occupying managerial positions in corporations, something that made 
the UK government impose legislative changes and governance reforms.  
In this study, the relationship between female boardroom participation and firm value 
was examined by using a panel data methodology. More specifically, female 
participation in managerial positions was measured by several variables, while firm 
value was measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. According to our findings, the presence 
of women on the board of directors does not influence firm value. However, we find 
that the diversity of the board (measured by the percentage of women and by the 
Blau and Shannon indexes) has a positive impact on firm value. That means that it is 
the balance between women and men that should concern UK companies instead of 
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merely the presence of women. What is more, it was shown that firm value does not 
affect women’s presence and gender diversity.  
After our research, we conclude that higher women representation shall be 
accomplished without affecting shareholder value and in fact Spanish investors are in 
a position to appreciate the female participation on boards of directors. Spain’s 2006 
Unified Good Governance Code promoted the female representation on boardroom 
appointments and this created a practice that will be followed in the terms of 
corporate governance in Spain. Further research is recommended on how female 
board members with family ties to the owners can affect firm performance and if 
there is any relationship between women’s skills and educational/ professional 
background and firm performance. If female board members’ CVs were taken into 
consideration, we could examine whether their promotion is socially or economically 
motivated and whether women representation affects the firm performance in a 
positive or negative way in the long run. Since Spanish government promotes policies 
for wider female participation on corporate boards, the need for an increased number 
of competent women to cover board chairs is arisen in order to keep the corporate 
performance sustainable.  
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